Regions to be Fearful? by Sykes, OJ & O'Brien, Philip
The UK government’s impact assessments on the
economic consequences of leaving the EU1 have
considered three scenarios – staying in the Single
Market, a trade deal with the EU, or no deal. They
show that in all these scenarios economic growth
over the next 15 years is expected to be less than 
if the UK were to remain fully within the EU. Aside
from the effects at an aggregate UK level, the
figures also project – as already suggested by
academic studies2 – that the impacts will be varied
across different parts of the UK.
They additionally suggest – again like previous
studies – that some of the areas that will fare the
most badly will be those that voted to leave the EU
in 2016, as they have economies that are more
integrated with, and thus more dependent on, EU
markets than a place like London.3
These questions have been largely neglected in
public debate during and since the EU referendum
in 2016 – the potentially differential territorial impacts
of leaving the EU being more on the radar of local
leaders and policy-makers and some academics and
particular sectors than headline news. As Cliff Hague
has commented, ‘I doubt that the phrase ‘territorial
cohesion’ was ever uttered in the thousands of
speeches and pamphlets’ during the EU referendum.4
The aftermath raises questions such as: what can
be done to anticipate and if necessary mitigate any
potentially negative impacts; and what kind of
regional policy (if any) may take shape if the UK
leaves the EU? Reflecting on these issues involves
considered evaluation of any potential regional impacts
of leaving the EU, and of how to try to foster spatial
cohesion in an unevenly developed state like the
UK, in which some territories are already ‘more
equal than others’ due to the natural functioning of
the spatial economy, differentiated levels of public
funding, and variable levels of devolution.
These questions are given added salience by the
important role played by the EU’s regional ‘cohesion
policy’ in UK regions since the country joined the
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then EEC in the 1970s. And there is an irony here
too in the fact that the UK was instrumental in the
foundation of a European regional policy,5 working
alongside Ireland and Italy to place the idea firmly
on the European agenda. This was one of the many
influences that the UK exerted over the direction of
the EEC/EU, and this contribution is well recognised
and appreciated across Europe.
The creation of such a policy at European level
was particularly timely for the UK’s economically
depressed areas, as from the late 1970s regional
policy fell out of favour under the governments of
Margaret Thatcher, which were more inclined to let
regions fend for themselves. However, the EEC/EU
and politicians like Michael Heseltine still believed
that state and targeted public investment had a role
in giving places suffering economic, social and
environmental challenges a fighting chance to
regenerate themselves.
Against this backdrop,6 Merseyside presents one
of the most striking examples of how the EU’s
concern for ‘territorial cohesion’ – the idea that all
regions and their people should have a chance to
grow and enjoy a good quality of life, and that
nobody and no place should be left behind – could
foster the regeneration and renaissance of places.
The EU dimension also gave greater autonomy to
cities and regions, who could use three-way
negotiation between themselves, the UK government
and the European Commission to demand and
achieve better outcomes for their places and people.
By contrast, the ‘proto-Brexit’ state is almost by
definition ‘nationalist’ in its spatial imagination and
scope. Not just in the fairly obvious political sense,
but in what geographers would call a ‘scalar’ terms
too, in that it privileges an overwhelming focus 
on how the UK is doing ‘overall’ at the aggregate
national level – as this is the level at which leaving
the EU must be seen to be a success for the
advocates of this change in the UK’s circumstances.
The recent Industrial Strategy White Paper7
largely seeks to pick certain ‘winning’ sectors that
can be fostered to become ‘world class’, rather than
looking more at place-based issues. As a result it
may reward some places (which have the ‘right’
sectors for investment) and leave others in the
shadows. This may well do little to address the
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regional imbalances that are often held to be partly
responsible for the EU referendum outcome in 2016
– and could potentially make them worse by diverting
away scarce resources in an approach which breaks
with the European model of fostering strengthened
territorial cohesion. All this risks both neglecting the
fact that the UK is diverse and compounding the
impacts of any exit from the EU, which are likely to
be felt disproportionately in different places.
The spatially uneven impacts of leaving the EU 
on the UK economy appear set to collide with a
highly centralised UK state in which an authentic,
meaningfully resourced regional policy and the
institutional frameworks required to administer it
have been progressively weakened or dismantled,
leaving only a highly uneven patchwork of powers
and institutions at the city-regional scale outside the
devolved territories.
The possibility of creating the sub-national
institutional arrangements necessary for decision-
making in policy areas relating to economic
development, as a way of accounting for differential
local and regional conditions, seems likely to be
reduced by an already highly centralised state’s
desire to control policy and funds following any 
UK exit from the EU. Even before the projected
potential economic effects of leaving the Customs
Union and Single Market begin to take effect, the
present government’s disposition towards
decentralisation – evident in the virtual excision of
the sub-national dimension from the Industrial
Strategy in its Green Paper form, before its
publication as a White Paper – points to a future in
which the enthusiasm to address spatially uneven
growth in Western Europe’s most spatially
unbalanced major economy may be muted.
A change of government domestically may alter
this context, but the present vision of the future,
with a narrow economic and governmental focus,
demonstrates a sharp divergence from mainstream
European views on territorial cohesion and place-
based development, in which all regions matter and
economic policy is tailored to local and regional
conditions. The sense of political and cultural
dislocation felt by many as a reaction to the result 
of the UK’s EU membership referendum and the
course its politicians have subsequently put in train
has material consequences that manifest themselves
in the distancing of UK policy from the knowledge
and expertise of several decades’ worth of experience
in the design and monitoring of the cohesion policy.
The domestic political dimension is also very
significant here, for, despite the dominant media
representations, and as Danny Dorling8 reminds 
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us, the geography of so-called ‘Brexit’ is as much 
a geography of privilege as one of disadvantage. 
The future of regional policy in any post-EU UK will
effectively hang on the extent to which domestically
there is an appetite for some form of redistribution
– in other words how far the former geography will
wish to support the latter in a UK floating free from
EU (and historically British) principles of territorial
cohesion and inter-regional solidarity.
Meanwhile, as the EU steps up attempts to mitigate
tax avoidance by major transnational corporations,9
the Brexit elite in the UK see the opportunities to be
gained from leaving the EU as largely residing in
(de)regulatory competition across a range of sectors
and reduced tax burdens. It is hard to contemplate
the future of regional policy in the UK without taking
into account such contextual factors and the
characteristics of the UK as a polity.10 In light of the
latter, leaving the structure and partnership of EU
cohesion policy is perhaps unlikely to offer a
propitious moment to redesign regional policy and
make a case for expanding its resources.
As noted above, the future prospects for UK
regional policy will also hinge on the articulation of
the relationship between aggregate growth versus
redistribution/territorial balance, as gauges and
symbols of the success of any post-EU UK.
Conclusion
The EU has played an important role in supporting
reinvestment in UK areas needing regeneration –
either directly through EU regional funding, or
indirectly (because the UK was in the Single Market),
by offering an attractive context for big foreign
investments in sectors like the car industry. So a
key question now is: what kinds of mechanisms
might replace the EU support structures which have
served UK places like Merseyside so well? Yet there
is still precious little clarity on the shape and extent
of any replacement regional policy. There are also
further questions, such as:
● Will regional policy be able to play an effective
role in suturing a fragmented and divided nation
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within a potentially challenging context of
diminished aggregate growth and strained political
consensus?
● Which political calculations and trade-offs is it
possible to envisage emerging to underpin such 
a policy and make its delivery possible?
UK territories face all these questions and
uncertainties just as the new EU cohesion policy 
is taking shape and the aggregate growth which
makes such a policy easier to agree politically,
resource, and deliver is returning to the EU.11
In reflecting on the potential regional consequences
of leaving the EU, we should remember that
projections are not predictions and that there are
analyses which take a more optimistic view of
prospects for future growth.12 At the present time
there are also powerful interests and lobbies who
cultivate the idea that it is not really possible to
engage in meaningful assessment of future trends
and conditions, and that when such assessments
are undertaken by people like civil servants, or 
those who are apparently (to quote a recent
comment received by the authors in response 
to their work) ‘existentially dependent on the EU’ 
(for example academics), then the findings are
inevitably biased.
Yet bearing in mind Peter Hall’s view that one
definition of planning might be ‘a set of processes
whereby decision-makers engage in logical foresight
before committing themselves’, then on the basis of
economic fundamentals (notably the forecast regional
impacts of leaving the EU), and the continuing
opportunities that could be offered to UK regions by
a post-2020 EU cohesion policy, there remains a
strongly credible case that the interests of the UK’s
cities and regions (especially the economically
weaker ones) would be best served by continued
full EU membership.
There is surely a bittersweet irony, as we enter
the last years of the UK’s/England’s ‘regionally
sceptic’ decade, in the fact that it has been the
revelation of the government’s own assessments of
potentially negative impacts of leaving the EU on
many of the UK’s regions which may finally start to
focus minds on what could really be at stake if the
UK leaves the EU.
● Olivier Sykes and Phil O’Brien are with the Department of
Geography and Planning at the University of Liverpool. The
views expressed are personal. This article is based on work
undertaken for the Common Futures Network, which can be
accessed at http://commonfuturesnetwork.org/mdocuments-
library?mdocs-cat=mdocs-cat-31&att=null
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